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Princeton University and NBER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Workers' compensation insurance provides cash payments and medical
benefits to workers who incur a work-related injury or illness. Many
features of the workers' compensation program parallel features of pro-
posed mandated employer-paid health insurance plans. This paper em-
pirically examines the incidence of the workers' compensation program
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to infer the likely consequences of mandated health insurance propos-
als. In certain industries, such as trucking and carpentry, workers' com-
pensation insurance costs are quite large, and vary tremendously within
states over time, and across states at a moment in time. This variation is
used to identify the incidence of the program. Empirical analysis of two
data sets suggests that changes in employers' costs of workers' compen-
sation insurance are largely shifted to employees in the form of lower
wages. In addition, higher insurance costs are found to have a negative
but statistically insignificant effect on employment. The implied elastic-
ity of labor demand from our results is about —.50.
There are two primary methods that a government can use to provide
universal access to a good or service: it can provide the good or service
directly, as in the case of public education and national parks, or it can
mandate that employers arrange for provision of the good or service for
their workers and dependents, as in the case of workers' compensation
insurance and certain pension safeguards. These two approaches may
have different implications for the efficiency and equity of a public pro-
gram. Interest in understanding the economic impact of employer man-
dates has risen in recent years as several mandated employer-provided
health insurance proposals have gained support.
An estimated 15.2% of Americans under age 65 (some 33 million peo-
ple) lack health insurance coverage.
1 Bills that would require employers
to provide the uninsured with a minimum level of medical insurance are
currently pending before the Congress and many state legislatures, and
such legislation has already been enacted in Hawaii and Massachusetts.
These bills are markedly different from national health insurance plans
in most European countries, which are funded by general revenues and
administered directly by the state.
Several factors explain the current political popularity of mandated
health insurance proposals. More than two-thirds of the uninsured are
full-time, full-year workers or are in families that are headed by a full-
time, full-year worker. Moreover, nearly 80% of those with medical
insurance already obtain their insurance from an employer-sponsored
plan.
2 Consequently, employer mandates have the potential to extend
health insurance coverage to a large number of uninsured individuals
without radically restructuring the insurance industry. Furthermore,
mandating that employers provide health insurance for their workers is
1 This estimate was calculated by the authors from the March 1989 Current Population
Survey, and pertains to calendar year 1988.
2 These statistics are from Chollet (1987).The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 113
a way for the government to expand health insurance coverage without
raising taxes. This feature of mandated benefits takes on added signifi-
cance in an era of tight budget constraints.
Although the government may be able to shed responsibility for the
cost of providing health insurance in a mandated program, there may
nevertheless be substantial societal costs to such a program. In particu-
lar, requiring employers to pay health insurance premiums may increase
the cost of hiring workers and result in lower employment. Indeed, Dr.
Lewis Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, recently based
his opposition to mandated health benefits on the presumption that: "By
adding overly burdensome mandates on business, we could retard eco-
nomic growth and constrict employment opportunities."
3
But will mandated health insurance dramatically reduce employment?
Traditional payroll tax incidence models suggest that some portion of
the rise in employer costs may be shifted to wages, mitigating the fall in
employment. And perhaps more importantly, if employees value health
insurance, the theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that
wages will fall even further than in the case of a pure payroll tax, further
reducing the employment decline. In equilibrium, if the value employ-
ees place on health insurance is equivalent to the employers' costs of
providing insurance, wages will be reduced by the full cost of the benefit
and employment will be unchanged.
Although economic models provide a clear framework for analyzing
the impact of compulsory insurance, the available empirical evidence on
the trade-off between fringe benefits and wages provides little evidence of
wage offsets. In fact, an impressive number of published papers report
the "wrong" signed coefficient in analyses of the wage-fringe benefit
relationship.
4 More generally, the labor economics literature has been
largely unsuccessful in documenting consistent evidence of compensat-
ing wage differentials for a variety of nonpecuniary factors, such as the
risk of unemployment and workplace hazards.
5 The findings of this litera-
ture challenge the view that the costs of mandated employer-provided
health insurance will be shifted to employees in the form of lower pay.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the empirical evidence
may fail to find evidence of a trade-off between fringe benefits and
wages even if such a trade-off exists. First, available data sets do not
permit researchers to control for all aspects of worker productivity. This
3 Quoted from The New York Times, July 24, 1990, p. A10.
A good example of this literature is Smith and Ehrenbt
ire given in Section II.
See Brown (1980) and Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) for examples.
4 A good example of this literature is Smith and Ehrenberg (1983). Additional references
are given in Section II.224 Gruber & Krueger
is a problem because more productive employees may prefer to take
their compensation in the form of both higher wages and higher fringe
benefits. Second, most of the literature has examined fringe benefits that
are voluntarily chosen by employers and employees. With voluntary
fringes, it is difficult to identify exogenous variation in benefits that
should induce wage offsets. Finally, the studies that have examined the
effect on wages of mandated benefits (e.g., unemployment insurance)
are identified by relatively small differences in program costs across
states and over time. As a result, any trade-off between fringes and
wages could easily be swamped by greater variation in omitted, state-
level factors, such as union power.
This paper presents new evidence on the incidence of mandated
employer-provided insurance by examining the experience of the work-
ers' compensation insurance program. Workers' compensation laws re-
quire employers to secure insurance to provide a minimum level of cash
payments and medical benefits in the event of work-related injuries and
illnesses. The laws are exclusively administered by the states, which
leads to wide variation in the generosity of the program across the states
at a point in time, and within states over time. For example, the insur-
ance rate in the trucking industry in 1987 ranged from 3% of payroll in
Indiana to 25% of payroll in Montana. We use two data sets to estimate
the effect of increases in workers' compensation costs on wages and
employment. Throughout much of the analysis we focus on five high-
risk industries (truck drivers, carpenters, plumbers, gasoline station em-
ployees, and nonprofessional hospital employees) that have great cost
variability.
The structure of the workers' compensation program enables us to
overcome at least some of the limitations of the past literature. First,
workers' compensation benefits are not voluntary fringe benefits. Sec-
ond, we test for insurance shifting in narrowly defined industries and
occupations, so bias due to omitted worker and job characteristics poses
less of a problem. Third, most of the analysis uses the wide variation in
the growth of insurance rates in states over a 10-year period to identify
the extent of insurance rate shifting. We are aware of no other payroll
"tax" that varies as much across states or over time as workers' compen-
sation insurance rates.
Finally, we note that the workers' compensation insurance program
has much in common with proposed mandated health insurance
schemes. In both programs, employers are required to secure a mini-
mum level of insurance for their workers, and employers directly pay
the insurance premiums. Furthermore, a substantial component (over
35% of costs) of the workers' compensation program is medical insur-The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 115
ance for workplace injuries and illnesses. Consequently, inferences
drawn from the workers' compensation program may be relevant for
mandated health insurance.
I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Summers (1989) argues that, because of wage offsets, the incidence and
welfare costs of employer mandated benefits are different from that of a
pure payroll tax, which is used to finance public provision of benefits.
6
The basic point of his argument is illustrated in Figure I.
7 The imposition
of an employer mandate will shift the labor demand curve downward
(from DD to D'D') and, with a fixed labor supply schedule, employment
would fall from Eo to £x and wages from Wo to Wv However, if workers value the benefit that they are receiving, labor supply will shift outward,
and employment will fall by a lesser amount (to E2 in Figure 1), whereas
wages will fall by an even greater amount (to W2). Thus, wage offsets in
response to mandated benefits have the potential to reduce the labor
cost increases created by mandated benefits.
8
Formally, suppose that labor demand (Ld) is given by
L, = /d(W + C) (1)
and further suppose that labor supply (Ls) is given by
Ls = fs(W + aC) (2)
where C is the cost of mandated health insurance, aC is the monetary
value that employees place on health insurance, and W is the wage rate.
Using this notation it can easily be shown that
dW = _ -rf - aif
dCtf-rf
6 Danzon (1989) provides a related analysis, which also models the impact of heterogene-
ous workers and considers the general equilibrium implications.
7 We have drawn the labor supply curve assuming the substitution effect dominates the
income effect in the relevant range.
8 As Summers notes, this analysis must be construed differently for health care benefits,
which are fixed with respect to hours of (full-time) work, and for other types of benefits.
This does not affect the analysis as long as one assumes that employment, rather than
hours, are represented on the horizontal axis.116 Gruber & Krueger
Employment
FIGURE 1. The Labor Market Impact of Mandated Benefits
where r/
d and 17
s are the elasticities of demand for and supply of labor,
respectively. From equation (3) it is clear that if a equals one, wages would
fall by the full cost of the mandated benefit. In this situation, the em-
ployer's cost of providing the mandated benefit would be fully shifted to
employees. On the other hand, if employees place no value on mandated
health insurance, which is the case if a = 0, the incidence of mandated
health insurance is exactly analogous to that of a payroll tax.
As explained below, we rely on interstate differences in workers' com-
pensation costs across industrial groups over a 10-year time period in
our empirical work. If, as seems likely, workers are mobile across states
and/or industries over this time horizon, 17
s will be quite large. In the
limit, as 17
s approaches infinity the proportion of costs that are shifted to
wages tends to a.
The effect of mandating benefits on employment is
dL W0-W2- C (4)
which indicates that the amount of employment sacrificed because of
mandated health insurance is inversely related to the wage offset caused
by the provision of health insurance. Thus, we can summarize the labor
market effects of mandated benefits in terms of the elasticities of supplyThe Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 117
and demand for labor, the cost of the benefit, and the fraction of that cost
that is valued by employees.
A. Previous Evidence
What is the evidence for the shifting of employer benefit costs? A large
empirical literature addresses this question by estimating hedonic labor
market relationships (see Rosen, 1987 for a survey). However, past ef-
forts to find the expected negative coefficient on fringe benefits in wage
equations have been largely unsuccessful, as is discussed by Triplett
(1983), Smith and Ehrenberg (1983), Leibowitz (1983), and Monheit, Ha-
gan, Berk, and Farley (1985). Perhaps the failure to find a trade-off
between fringe benefits and wages should not be surprising in view of
the difficulty establishing compensating wage differentials for a variety
of other nonwage aspects of work, including the risk of layoff. In fact,
with the notable exception of work fatalities, the labor economics litera-
ture has not found consistent evidence of compensating wage differen-
tials for work disamenities (Brown, 1980, Smith, 1979).
One of the difficulties in interpreting this literature, however, is that
most studies of compensating differentials compare wages and working
conditions among workers in different occupations and industries.
There is nothing in the theory of compensating differentials to suggest
that lawyers should receive less generous fringe benefits than manual
laborers because of their higher wage. Indeed, if fringe benefits are a
normal good, one would expect higher-paid workers to take some of
their compensation in the form of better working conditions and fringe
benefits. Nevertheless, the past literature on compensating differentials
should challenge researchers to search for additional evidence before
assuming that employee valuation of fringe benefits will be reflected in
the incidence of those benefits.
Finally, we note that a related empirical literature has developed
within public finance attempting to measure the incidence of payroll
taxes. Unlike research on compensating differentials, most of this re-
search is based on time-series or cross-country data. In an early cross-
country study, Brittain (1972) reports evidence that he interprets as
showing payroll taxes are fully offset by lower wages.
9 In an analysis of
an unusual natural social experiment, Holmlund (1983) uses time-series
data on payroll taxes in Sweden to examine wage growth in a period
when the payroll tax increased from 14 to 40%. He estimates that
9 More specifically, Brittain finds that capital's share does not decline with the imposition
of a payroll tax. See Feldstein (1972) for a detailed critique of Brittain's work, in which he
points out that Brittain's test can be viewed simply as evidence that the gross wage equals
the marginal product of labor.118 Gruber & Krueger
roughly 50% of the employer payroll tax is shifted to wages in the short
run. Finally, Hamermesh (1979) uses the variation in payroll tax rates
due to the social security payroll tax limit to estimate wage offsets; his




Although it would be desirable to have estimates of all of the parame-
ters in equation (3) to forecast the incidence of mandated insurance
benefits, in view of the past literature we have a more modest goal: We
simply would like to examine the empirical plausibility of wage offsets in
response to changes in the employers' cost of providing mandated bene-
fits in the workers' compensation insurance program. If the evidence
suggests that the employers' cost of providing workers' compensation
insurance are offset by lower wages, then the expectation that mandated
health insurance costs would be shifted to wages will be strengthened.
B. Description of Health Insurance Proposals
The potential importance of cost shifting of mandated health benefits is
highlighted in Table 1, which summarizes several recent Federal and state
proposals to compel employers to provide health care benefits. The Fed-
eral proposal (The Basic Health Benefits for All Americans Act) would
mandate that all full-time workers have health insurance, with firms pay-
ing at least 80% of the premiums.
1
1 Similarly, the state proposals include
some employer costs, either through a strict provision mandate, through
a payroll tax, or through a "pay-or-play" plan, in which firms that do not
provide a certain minimum level of health care must pay the difference in
the form of a payroll tax. For example, in Massachusetts, any firm that
does not spend an average of 12% of the Medical Security Wage Base on
employee health benefits must pay the difference into a fund from which
the state will purchase insurance for the uninsured.
1
2
Table 1 indicates that employers will nominally bear the cost of provid-
ing health insurance for their employees according to the proposed legis-
lation in each state. In addition, many of the proposed laws would use
tax revenue generated by employer mandates to fund a larger universal
insurance system, which would extend coverage to uninsured individu-
1
0 Hamermesh's range of tax rates is from 0 to 5.85%. By contrast, the range in workers'
compensation insurance rates across states in the industries we examine is from 3 to 26% of
payroll.
1
1 This bill passed the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, and is currently
being discussed, along with alternative proposals, by a bipartisan Senate working group.
1
2 This base is currently $14,000, and is indexed for medical inflation.The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 119
als who do not work. If the insurance provided to nonemployed indi-
viduals is commensurate with that provided through employment, the
labor supply curve depicted in Figure 1 would not shift. More generally,
the extent the labor supply curve shifts is inversely related to the quality
of health insurance provided to nonworkers.
1
3
The ultimate incidence of mandated employer-provided health insur-
ance plans is difficult to predict because of the modest experience with
such plans in the United States. However, the structure of workers'
compensation insurance, which in many respects is similar to proposed
health insurance plans, provides an opportunity to estimate the actual
incidence of mandated employer-provided insurance.
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE
Workers' compensation insurance is the oldest and largest mandated
employer benefit program in the United States. In 1987 (the latest year
with available data) workers' compensation benefits totaled $27.4 billion,
and employer insurance costs equalled $38 billion.
1
4 The structure of the
program allows for a test of the incidence of mandated benefits. Employ-
ers are required to purchase insurance or self-insure to provide a mini-
mum level of cash benefits and medical care for workers who suffer a
work-related injury or illness. Employees are covered by workers' com-
pensation immediately on being hired.
The level of benefits that employers are required to provide varies
tremendously across states, and has increased substantially in many
states since the mid-1970s.
1
5 Table 2 documents the variability in work-
ers' compensation benefits for a sample of 10 states. In Indiana, for
example, an employee whose arm is permanently disabled in a work-
related accident is entitled to a maximum indemnity benefit of $27,450.
The same injury in Illinois qualifies for a maximum benefit that is more
than five times as generous ($142,112). Similarly, benefits for the other
types of injuries exhibit tremendous variability across states.
In addition, although it is difficult to quantify, it is widely believed
1
3 Notice also that as the quality of health insurance provided to nonworkers improves, the
relative efficiency gains of mandated benefits vis-a-vis public provision, which Summers
(1989) emphasizes, declines.
1
4 These statistics are from Nelson (1990), Tables 1 and 7.
1
5 In large part, several states increased their workers' compensation benefits in the 1970s
to conform with the recommendations of the National Commission on Workmen's Com-
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TABLE 2
Maximum Indemnity Benefits Paid to Selected Types of Work Injuries:

































































































1 Benefit is for loss of use of index finger.
Source: Derived from 2990 Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws. Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, 1990, Chart 6 and 7.
that some states are more restrictive than others in permitting certain
kinds of claims. This is especially likely to be the case for back injuries,
which are difficult to diagnose objectively, and costly to treat.
1
6 Finally,
some states require more generous medical benefits than others. For




In most states workers' compensation insurance rates are established
by a rating bureau. In principle, these rates are based on the actuarial
cost of workers' compensation insurance, which is the expected benefit
paid to each injury times the probability that a worker will incur each
type of injury. A different rate is established for several hundred de-
tailed industrial/occupational groups, known as activities. In 36 states, a
national rate-making organization known as the National Council on
Compensation Insurance (NCCI) pools information on risks and pro-
poses rates for each activity. Several other states follow procedures that
1
6 We also note that there is variability across states in the waiting period required before
benefit payments commence, and in the retroactive period on which benefits are paid
retroactively to compensate for the waiting period.
1
7 See Boden and Fleishman (1989) for an analysis of interstate differences in medical costs
in workers' compensation insurance.The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 123
are similar to the NCCI. The rates adopted by the states are known as
"manual" rates.
Manual rates are the initial rate posted to firms, but they are not the
actual, bottom line cost of insurance in many cases. For many employ-
ers, manual rates are adjusted in response to the specific firm's loss
experience (e.g., experience rating), dividends are paid by insurance
companies, and large firms may be retrospectively rated.
1
8 Because man-
ual rates and the bottom line insurance costs are highly correlated, man-
ual rates provide a reasonable approximation of the actuarial cost of
benefits for each activity.
1
9 Furthermore, unlike in unemployment insur-
ance, there is no cross-industry subsidization in workers' compensation
rates.
Table 3 summarizes the interstate variability in workers' compensa-
tion rates for 47 states with comparable rating systems in 1987.
2
0 The
table focuses on five activities that are the focus of our empirical analysis
on premium
1 shifting (carpenters, gasoline station workers, nonprofes-
sional hospital employees, plumbers, and truck drivers).
2
1 These activi-
ties were selected because they comprise a large sample of workers in
most states, and because they concord well with the occupational and
industry definitions used by the Census Bureau. Furthermore, we se-
lected these activities because work-injury rates are high in these jobs.
For example, Table 3 shows that 1 in 20 truck drivers receives workers'
compensation in a year, as opposed to less than 1 in 50 workers in all
jobs. Because work injuries are a prominent feature of employment in
these jobs, it is more likely that workers will be aware of their benefits
under workers' compensation insurance and that the cost of providing
these benefits will be shifted onto wages.
Table 4 further illustrates the variability in insurance costs by listing
the manual rates for truck drivers in each state in 1978 and 1987. The
spread in insurance rates for truck drivers across the states is enormous.
For example, in 1987 the rate for truck drivers in Minnesota was 21% of
1
8 The rate-making process is described in detail in Burton, Hunt, and Krueger (1985).
Although on net experience rating hardly changes the average cost of workers' compensa-
tion insurance in a state, the other rating devices tend to reduce employers' costs, on
average.
1
9 For example, the correlation between the average manual rate in a state and the average
manual rates adjusted to reflect dividends, experience rating, premium discounts, and rate
deviations is 0.85. (Source: authors' estimates based on Table 4 and Table 22 of Burton,
Hunt, and Krueger, 1985.)
2
0 The insurance rates are described in more detail in the Data Appendix.
2
1 The rates for carpenters are a weighted average of two carpentry classes (NCCI class
5403 and 5645), where the weights are the payroll attributed to each class nationally.124 Gruber & Krueger
TABLE 3

























































1 The insurance rates described in the first four columns refer to the "manual" rate for each state. No
adjustments have been made for premium discounts, experience rating, dividends, and other competi-
tive devices.
2 Means and standard deviations (SD) are weighted by each industry's employment in the state. The
sample consists of 46 states and the District of Columbia.
3 The incidence rate measures the percent of private, non-self-employed workers who received income
from workers' compensation insurance in calender years 1986 and 1987. These estimates were derived
from the March 1987 and 1988 Current Population Survey tapes by the authors.
4 The average manual rate for all activities is a payroll-weighted average of 44 activities, which account
for 61% of payroll covered by workers' compensation insurance. This estimate is taken from Burton and
Schmidle (1989, Table 1).
TABLE 4
Workers' Compensation Rates as a Percent of Payroll in the Trucking
Industry (Class 7219)
Change





























































































































































































payroll, while the rate for the same category of workers in Indiana was
only 3% of payroll.
2
2 Furthermore, there is great diversity among the
states in the growth in these insurance rates over the last 10 years. For
example, rates soared from 9.7 to 20.3% of payroll in Hawaii between
1978 and 1987, while they fell by nearly 4 points in New York over the
same time period. An important source of variation for within-state
changes in workers' compensation costs over time is changes in benefit
generosity (see Krueger and Burton, 1990; Butler and Worrall, 1990).
We are aware of only one study that uses interstate variation in work-
2
2 Insurance rates for truck drivers are especially high because they have a high injury rate,
and because their injuries tend to be relatively costly. Interestingly, data for Minnesota
indicate that only 14% of truck drivers' injuries are from highway accidents, while almost
half are from falls or strains and sprains (see Lewis, Meyers, and Senese, 1988).226 Gruber & Krueger
ers' compensation costs to estimate the extent of shifting of mandated
benefits.
2
3 Dorsey and Walzer (1983) use the May 1978 Current Popula-
tion Survey to estimate the trade-off between employer liability for in-
juries as measured by workers' compensation costs and earnings. They
find a large, negative effect of workers' compensation costs on wages in
the nonunion sector, and a large, positive effect of workers' compensa-
tion costs in the union sector. Our analysis has several different features
than Dorsey and Walzer's. Most importantly, we estimate the extent of
cost shifting for narrowly defined activities that have wide interstate
variability in costs, and we incorporate permanent state effects in the
analysis. In addition, we provide estimates of the effect of workers'
compensation insurance costs on employment.
III. ESTIMATES OF THE INCIDENCE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION INSURANCE
We base our initial analysis of insurance cost shifting on microdata from
the merged outgoing rotation group (OGRG) samples of the Current
Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey of a rotating
sample of over 55,000 households containing approximately 110,000 indi-
viduals. The Outgoing Rotation Group files consist of all individuals who
are in their last survey month. The extracts of the CPS that we use are
described in detail in the Data Appendix. Briefly, our sample contains
privately employed carpenters, truck drivers, nonprofessional hospital
employees, gasoline station employees, and plumbers. Self-employed
workers are excluded from the sample. The data are taken from the 1979,
1980, 1981, 1987, and 1988 CPS files. For each worker in the sample we
merge on the corresponding workers' compensation manual rate in the
worker's state and industry/occupation group (activity).
2
4 A worker is
observed in only one year, but we can control for permanent state effects
because each year we have a sample of individuals from a constant set of
states.
The CPS data have several advantages over other microdata sets for
2
3 Moore and Viscusi (1990, Chapter 2) review several studies that estimate the relation-
ship between wages and workers' compensation benefit levels. Most of these studies find a
negative relationship.
2
4 To be precise, we assign the 1978 workers' compensation rates to individuals in the
1979-1981 CPSs, and the 1987 rates to individuals in the 1987-1988 CPS. Data on workers'
compensation rates for most states were provided to us by John F. Burton, Jr., from his
ongoing research on measuring workers' compensation costs. Tracking down rates for all
the intervening years would be a difficult task, and we suspect that using rates for 1978 and
1987 does not greatly affect the results.The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 127
this analysis. Most importantly, the large samples provided by the CPS
enable us to focus on a narrow set of activities. Furthermore, the CPS
contains information on several employee characteristics, including edu-
cation, potential experience, marital status, and apprenticeship status.
2
5
Using the pooled time-series/cross section of CPS data, we estimate a
wage equation of the following form separately for each industry/
occupation group:
lnW,yf = /30 + ftC,, + P2Xljt + at + h + el]t (5)
where In Wijt is the natural log of the usual hourly wage rate, C;f is the
appropriate workers' compensation rate, Xijt is a vector of covariates, at
represents a set of year dummy variables (1=1980,1981,1987,1988), ix}
represents a set of state dummy variables, and e^ is a stochastic error
term. The subscript i indicates individuals, j indicates states, and t indi-
cates years. Coefficient estimates are denoted by /8s.
In contrast to past studies of compensating differentials that pool indi-
viduals from different occupations and industries and then control for
average injury rates at the three-digit occupation or industry level, we
estimate the wage-cost trade-off relationship within each three-digit
industry/occupation group. Furthermore, since state and year dummy
variables are included in equation (5), the incidence of workers' compen-
sation costs is identified by varying patterns in workers' compensation
rates within states over time. An estimate -1 for fa would indicate that
increases in workers' compensation costs are fully offset by lower wages,
while a coefficient of 0 would imply no wage offsets.
Workers' compensation benefits are not subject to federal income tax.
Therefore, one might expect that the appropriate specification of equa-
tion (5) would utilize the after-tax wage as the dependent variable. How-
ever, if the tax rate for individuals in these activities is proportional to
wages, then because the dependent variable is specified in log form the
tax rate will be absorbed by the intercept term. Furthermore, the assump-
tion of proportional taxes is likely to be approximately correct in this
sample because most workers in these activities are below the earnings
ceiling for the OASDHI payroll tax, and because workers in these activi-
ties are likely to be in a common tax bracket for the federal income tax.
Estimates of equation (5) are reported for each activity in the first five
columns of Table 5. In four of the five activities we find a negative relation-
ship between workers' compensation insurance rates and wages, but the
relationship is statistically significant only for truck drivers. Also, the
2
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wage-costs trade-off is largest for truck drivers, with an estimated coeffi-
cient of —.97 (t-ratio = —2.9). The other results suggest that approxi-
mately half of workers' compensation costs are shifted to wages for
carpenters and gasoline station workers, but these estimates are fairly
imprecise. On the other hand, the estimated trade-off between wages
and insurance costs for plumbers is positive (1.73), but the coefficient
has a large standard error.
The other variables in the wage equation generally have their expected
signs. In all of these activities more education is associated with higher
earnings; there is a quadratic relationship between earnings and poten-
tial experience; part-time workers earn less per hour than full-time work-
ers, and apprentices earn less than fully trained workers. In addition,
the equations include but do not report year dummy variables. The
estimated coefficients for the year dummies indicate that real wages fell
by roughly 20% in these activities between 1979 and 1988.
Columns (6) and (7) of Table 5 contain estimates for the pooled sample
of the five activities. These equations also include four activity dummy
variables. In column (6) we include 44 state dummy variables. In column
(7) we interact the state dummy variables with the activity dummy vari-
ables. The estimated trade-off between insurance costs and wages de-
pends critically on the specification of the state effects. If each activity is
constrained to have the same effect (column 6), about 20% of workers'
compensation costs are estimated to be offset by lower wages. However,
if the activity effect is freed-up by state (column 7), fully 86.5% of work-
ers' compensation costs are shifted to employees. Furthermore, an F-test
indicates that state-by-activity effects explain a significant fraction of
wage variability over the constrained state effects.
Evidently, the fixed state wage effects are also related to the level of
workers' compensation costs. This relationship would occur, for exam-
ple, if in some states unions have traditionally been influential in rais-
ing wages in some industry/occupation groups but not in others, and if
influential unions are able to lobby for relatively more generous bene-
fits for the types of injuries experienced by their members (e.g., back
sprains vs. carpal tunnel syndrome). In this scenario, the less-restric-
tive model in column (7) would provide a more appropriate estimate of
the trade-off between wages and the employers' cost of workers' com-
pensation insurance.
A. The Importance of State Effects
The discussion above emphasizes the importance of the specification of
the state effects in the pooled sample. It should further be noted that if
the wage equations in Table 5 are estimated with the state effects omit-The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 131
ted from the equation, the estimated wage-cost relationship is positive
rather than negative in each of the five activities, as well as in the pooled
sample of activities. For example, the coefficient on costs in the wage
equation for truck drivers is positive .34 with a standard error of .16
when state effects are omitted.
There are several reasons to include state effects in the wage equa-
tions. First, state effects will pick up permanent cost of living differences
between areas. Second, and perhaps more important, omitted state fac-
tors that traditionally have determined the generosity of workers' com-
pensation benefits are likely to be correlated with the wage level of a
state. As mentioned previously, benefits are likely to be greater in states
that have a more powerful union movement, and strong union's are also
likely to raise wages for nonunion as well as union members in the state.
Another potential state-by-activity fixed effect is the risk of injury: Insur-
ance rates will be especially high for an activity in states where that
activity has an unusually high injury rate. Moreover, if there are compen-
sating wage differentials for injury risk, we would also expect to find a
positive association between insurance costs and wages.
2
6
To the extent that injury risk is permanently greater in some states
than in others (e.g., roads are always icier in Minnesota than in Florida,
which affects truck drivers but not plumbers), including state-by-activity
effects will control for within-industry state-level injury rate differences.
Furthermore, the recent growth in workers' compensation costs is not
likely to be due to union power, since union's influence has waned
considerably in the 1980s. Instead, recent growth in insurance costs is
likely to be due exogenous changes in medical costs, and to changes in
benefit levels in response to the National Commission on Workmen's
Compensation Laws' recommendations. In view of these consider-
ations, the within-state variation in costs is probably a more appropriate
source of identifying information.
B. Analysis of BLS Industry-Level Wage and Employment Data
In addition to the CPS, we analyze state-level, employer-reported data
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This data set is based on
employers' quarterly ES-202 reports, which are filed by all establishments
covered by unemployment insurance laws. In 1988, these data contained
26 We tried to assess directly the importance of this explanation by including the car
accident rate in the wage equations for the truck drivers, as a measure of injury risk.
Without including state effects, the car accident rate has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect, but its inclusion only slightly reduces the positive wage-cost relationship.
Because the vast majority of truck drivers' injuries are unrelated to driving accidents, the
car accident rate may be a poor measure of injury risk for these workers.132 Gruber & Krueger
information on 87.4 million private sector workers in 5.6 million establish-
ments nationwide, or 99 percent of the private sector workforce.
2
7 The
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) compiles state-level averages of employ-
ment and wages by four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
from the ES-202 reports. Thus, we can use the BLS data to examine both
wage and employment effects of workers' compensation insurance.
In comparison to the CPS, the BLS data have the advantage of being
based on a virtual census of employers in the state. A disadvantage of
the BLS data, however, is that the NCCI activity definitions do not
match as well with the BLS data as they do with the CPS data because
the BLS data are classified by industry alone. Therefore, to some extent
the BLS data blur the occupational distinctions in the NCCI activity
classifications.
We matched the state-level data for 1979 and 1988 to workers' compen-
sation rates in the preceding year for four of the five activities in the
sample. Unfortunately, it was necessary to exclude nonprofessional hos-
pital employees because the SIC classification system does not distin-
guish between professional and nonprofessional employees. However,
another six high-cost industries that can be matched between the NCCI
and SIC classifications were added to the sample. The additional indus-
tries are agricultural machinery, excavation, gas and oil dealerships,
lumber yards, masonry, and road and street construction.
2
8
Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of the change in log average wage
versus the change in insurance rates from 1978 to 1987 based on the BLS
state-level data. The size of each observation in the plot is proportional
to the number of truck drivers employed in the state. The graph also
displays the fitted line from an employment-weighted regression of
change in log wage on change in costs. A strong negative relationship is
apparent. The slope of the regression line is —1, which is very close to
the estimated extent of shifting in the trucking industry based on CPS
data. Furthermore, most of the states (especially the large ones) tend to
cluster fairly close around the regression line.
Table 6 reports estimates of regressions of the 10-year change (1979-
1988) in the log of the average wage on the change in insurance rates for
the pooled sample of activities. In levels, this specification is analogous
to the within-state-by-activity specification shown in column 7 of Table
2
7 The ES-202 data and the publicly available state-level data are described in BLS (1988).
We are grateful to Michael Buso of the BLS for creating an extract of these data for us.
2
8 These activities were excluded from the microanalysis either because they do not match
well with the three-digit census classifications and/or because the CPS sample sizes are too





























FIGURE 2. Trucking industry, 1979-1988.
0,1713
5, only we do not have controls for individual characteristics in the state-
level analysis. We estimate a similar equation with the change in log
employment as the dependent variable. In the first two columns we
limited the sample to the original sample of activities (excluding nonpro-
fessional hospital workers), and in the last two columns we use the
expanded set of 10 activities. The regressions are weighted by the num-
ber of reporting establishments in 1988.
TABLE 6
Aggregate Wage/Employment Data Coefficients with
















































1 Equations are estimated by weighted least squares, where the weights are the number of reporting
units in 1988.134 Gruber & Krueger
For the original sample, the wage regression yields virtually the same
coefficient on the workers' compensation cost variable as was found in
the CPS microdata (compare column 7 of Table 5 with column 1 of Table
6). The results indicate that 86% of increases in workers' compensation
costs are shifted to workers. The results for the expanded set of activities
indicate a smaller trade-off between wages and insurance costs (—.56),
but the estimate is still statistically significant and sizable. The similarity
between the aggregate results based on BLS data and the microlevel
wage regressions based on CPS data is reassuring, especially in light of
their different unit of observation and industry definitions.
Columns 2 and 4 report results of regressing the change in log employ-
ment on the change in insurance rates. Because insurance costs appear
to be only partially offset by lower wages, one would expect a negative
coefficient on insurance rates in these regressions. The results provide
some evidence of a negative effect of higher workers' compensation
rates on employment growth, but the estimated coefficient is less than
half its standard error in each sample.
2
9 If one assumes that 85% of
workers' compensation costs are shifted to wages and that the remaining
15% are borne by employers, then the coefficient estimate in column 2
suggests that the elasticity of labor demand is -.75. On the other hand,
if we assume that employers bear 44% of workers' compensation costs
(1 —.56), then the estimate in column 4 implies an elasticity of labor
demand of —.56. Although these estimates are extremely imprecise,
they are within the range of typical estimates of the elasticity of labor
demand (Card, 1990; Clark and Freeman, 1980).
The following calculation gives an indication of the magnitude of the
effect on employment of recent increases in workers' compensation insur-
ance costs. Between 1972 and 1987, nationwide workers' compensation
costs increased by about 1% of payroll, from .722 to 1.785% (Burton and
Schmidle, 1989). If 85% of this increase was borne by labor and .15% by
employers, and if we assume an elasticity of labor demand of —. 75, then
this increase in program costs would have reduced employment by .11%.
Since approximately 90 million workers are covered by workers' compen-




9 We note, however, that the estimated wage trade-off and employment trade-off for the
sample of 10 activities is sensitive to the weight used. The estimated wage-cost coefficient
ranges from —.50 to —.89 depending on whether the equation is weighted by number of
reporting units in 1979, employment in 1980, or average employment in 1979 and 1988. The
coefficient on costs in the employment equation ranges from -.03 to -.50, depending on
the weight used.
3
0 According to Nelson (1990), in 1987 approximately 88.4 million workers were covered by
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IV. APPLICATION: HEALTH INSURANCE
What can we infer about the likely consequences of mandatory employer-
provided health insurance from the estimated incidence of the workers'
compensation insurance program? Because employers who already pro-
vide health insurance are unlikely to be affected by such a mandate it is
useful to consider the sectors of the workforce that have a low rate of
coverage by healthy insurance. Table 7 reports the percent of various
subgroups of the population that was covered by some form of health
insurance in 1988. The relatively low rates of coverage for workers in the
construction and agricultural industries, in small firms, and in low-wage
jobs have been documented previously (e.g., Chollet, 1987).
The low rate of health insurance coverage in low-wage jobs is poten-
tially important for our purposes because the floor established by the
minimum wage may impede wage offsets that would otherwise result
from mandating health insurance. The jobs we have examined in the
workers' compensation program typically have wage rates well above
the minimum wage. If an uninsured worker's wage is at or slightly
above the minimum wage, the minimum wage may prevent wage off-
sets from occurring in response to benefit mandates. The existence of
this kind of an institutional impediment would cause a greater employ-
ment reduction than suggested from our analysis of workers' compensa-
tion insurance.
3
1 Several authors have noted that the minimum wage
may inhibit wage offsets in response to mandated health insurance (see
Reinhardt, 1987; Monheit, Hagan, Berk, and Farley, 1985; Chollet, 1987).
An important question is: How large is the share of uninsured workers
that is potentially constrained by the minimum wage?
In an influential study based on the 1986 March CPS, Chollet (1987)
claims that as many as 50% of uninsured workers earn less than 125% of
the minimum wage, and that 35% of uninsured workers earn the mini-
mum wage or less. Although we will present evidence suggesting these
figures exaggerate the impact of the minimum wage, if a great many of
the uninsured earn the minimum wage it is hard to imagine that impor-
tant wage offsets would occur in response to mandated benefits.
To explore the impact of the minimum wage on health insurance
shifting, we use the March 1989 CPS to estimate the earnings distribu-
tion of uninsured workers. We restrict the sample to non-self-employed
individuals between age 16 and 65 who worked for pay in 1988. For each
3
1 We note, of course, that insurance costs could be shifted by means of nonwage elements
of the compensation package for minimum wage workers. Holzer, Katz, and Krueger's
(1990) analysis of application rates suggests incomplete rent dissipation in minimum wage
jobs, however.236 Gruber & Krueger
TABLE 7
















>35 hours, 48 weeks
>18 hours, 26 weeks
Wages
W < $3.35/hour
$3.35 < W < $5/hour



















































































































































Source: Authors' calculations from the March 1989 Current Population Survey.The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 137
TABLE 8
Percentage of Uninsured Workers Falling into Various Wage Intervals
1
Wage between Wage between














Uncovered 16.8 9.0 16.9
Uncovered by employer 15.2 8.3 14.8
plan
1 Sample excludes self-employed workers, and those who earn less than $1.00 per hour or more than
$100 per hour. Sample size is 8506 for Part A and 6482 for Part B.
Source: authors' calculations from the March 1989 CPS.
worker in the sample, an average hourly wage rate is calculated by
dividing annual earnings by the product of annual weeks worked and
usual weekly hours. To trim outliers, we exclude observations on indi-
viduals whose derived hourly earnings are below $1 per hour, or greater
than $100 per hour.
3
2 This sample is used to calculate the share of unin-
sured workers that is likely to be affected by the minimum wage.
The first row of Table 8 gives the fraction of all uninsured workers who
fall into various wage intervals.
3
3 The second row gives the fraction of
workers who are not covered by an employer-sponsored insurance plan
who fall into each wage interval. Part B contains the same set of esti-
mates for full-time, full-year workers (i.e., those who worked at least 26
weeks in the year and usually worked 18 hours or more per week). The
results indicate that 19.4% of all uninsured workers in 1988 earned the
minimum wage or less. The estimate is 16.8% when we limit the sample
to full-time, full-year workers, which is the group most likely to be
covered by a mandated health insurance law.
For several reasons, we prefer estimates that place a window around
the minimum wage, rather than the open-interval estimates in column 1.
First, the annual average hourly wage rate is likely to be measured with
3
2 Eliminating outliers in this fashion does not qualitatively affect the results once the self-
employed are excluded from the sample.
3
3 The various sources of health insurance coverage are Medicare, Medicaid, CHAMPUS/
VA care, employment-based insurance, and private health insurance. Coverage may be in
one's own name or as a dependent.138 Gruber & Krueger
considerable noise because it is based on self-reported annual hours of
work, which is notoriously poorly measured (Duncan and Hill, 1985).
Second, some workers who earn more than the minimum wage may be
constrained by the minimum wage because their earnings are prevented
from falling below the wage floor in response to mandated health insur-
ance. Finally, we wish to put a lower bound below the minimum wage
because there is a tremendous amount of noncompliance with the mini-
mum wage.
3
4 If some individuals are paid less than the minimum—
either legally or illegally—there is no reason to suspect that their wages
will not be reduced if their employers are required to provide them with
health insurance.
Column (2) places a 35tf window around the minimum wage, and col-
umn (3) places a 60tf window around the minimum wage. Since the esti-
mated hourly cost of meeting the Federal health insurance mandate is 55tf
for a full-time, full-year worker (U.S. Congress, 1989), the wider interval
in column (3) is probably a slight overstatement of the percent of unin-
sured workers who are constrained by the minimum wage. No matter
how the wage intervals are defined, however, the results in Table 8 are
quite different from Chollett's estimate that 50% of uninsured workers
will be constrained by the minimum wage. According to our estimates,
less than 20% of uninsured workers earn within 60tf of the minimum
wage. Although this is a nontrivial share of the uninsured, it suggests that
for the majority of uninsured workers there is scope for wage offsets
engendered by mandated employer-provided health insurance.
Why are our estimates considerably lower than Chollett's, even
though both are based on March CPS data? The discrepancy is mainly
due to the fact that we exclude self-employed workers. For example,
including the self-employed raises the estimate of the number of unin-
sured workers below the minimum wage by nearly 10 percentage points.
However, we believe that three reasons justify excluding the self-
employed from these tabulations. First, the proposals outlined in Table 1
do not apply to self-employed workers. Second, self-employed workers
are typically exempted from State and Federal minimum wage laws.
Third, the earnings of the self-employed reflect returns and losses to
capital investments.
Finally, we note that Table 8 may give an overestimate of the impact of
the minimum wage for mandated benefits because many of the pro-
posed mandated health insurance laws provide subsidies to small em-
ployers. Since relatively many low-wage workers are employed by small
3
4 The extent of noncompliance with minimum wage was first documented by Ashenfelter
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establishments, these subsidies would reduce the employers' costs of
providing health care to low-wage workers. Tabulations from the March
1989 CPS indicate that 42% of uninsured individuals who earn less than
the minimum wage are in firms with 25 employees or fewer.
On the other hand, the real minimum wage has increased since March
1989, and thus may be more of a constraint. Nevertheless, our results
suggest that the minimum wage may not be as much of an impediment
to wage adjustments in response to mandated benefits as previously
believed.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the impact of cost shifting in response to
increases in mandated workers' compensation insurance costs. The re-
sults suggests that a substantial portion of the cost to employers of
providing workers' compensation benefits is shifted to employees in
the form of lower wages. Given the similarity between workers' com-
pensation insurance and many proposed employer-mandated health
insurance plans, our findings suggest that a large share of the em-
ployers' cost of meeting health insurance mandates may be borne by
employees. Furthermore, our tabulations of the share of uninsured
workers whose earnings are near the minimum wage suggest that in
1988 less than one-fifth of uninsured workers were likely to be con-
strained by the minimum wage. Although the nominal burden of man-
dated employment-based health insurance will be borne by firms, if the
experience of health insurance is similar to that of workers' compensa-
tion insurance, our estimates suggest that employees will ultimately
bear a large fraction of the burden of financing mandated health insur-
ance through lower wages.
In spite of our main conclusion that a sizable portion of the cost of
mandated benefits is likely to be shifted to employees, we should also
stress that the shifting of workers' compensation costs is incomplete.
Employers bear at least some additional cost because of mandated work-
injury insurance. As a consequence, we find that increases in workers'
compensation costs are associated with reduced employment growth.
Although extremely imprecise, our estimates suggest that every one
percentage point increase in workers' compensation rates is associated
with an employment decline of .11%. The adverse employment effects of
mandated health insurance may well be larger than those in workers'
compensation insurance because the minimum wage is likely to be more
of a constraint for uninsured workers, especially in view of recent in-
creases in the real minimum.140 Gruber & Krueger
VI. DATA APPENDIX
A. Workers' Compensation Insurance Rates
The workers' compensation insurance rates used in Table 3-6 and Fig-
ure 2 are state manual rates, collected from each state's rate pages.
Manual rates are expressed as a proportion of payroll. Manual rate data
were generously provided to us by John F. Burton, Jr. In some cases, if
manual rates were not available for a state we used the rate for the
assigned risk pool, less 10%. The rate for the Minnesota trucking indus-
try in 1987 is from Lewis, Myers, and Senese (1988), and is based on
insurance industry data. Data are available for a maximum of 44 states
and the District of Columbia in both 1978 and 1987. The states in the
sample use the NCCI rating classification system, or a comparable sys-
tem. The NCCI codes for the five activities used in the analysis are truck
drivers (NCCI 7219), plumbers (NCCI 5183), gasoline service station
employees (NCCI 8387), nonprofessional hospital employees (NCCI
9040), and carpenters (weighted average of NCCI 5403 and 5645).
B. CPSData
The CPS data used in Table 5 are from the outgoing rotation group files
for 1979, 1980, 1981, 1987, and 1988. The sample was limited to individu-
als between age 18 and 65 who were privately employed. The sample
only includes individuals from the 45 jurisdictions that have manual rate
data in 1978 and 1987. The 1978 manual rate was merged to observations
in the 1979, 1980, and 1981 CPS samples; the 1987 manual rate was
merged to observations in the 1987 and 1988 CPS samples. The "usual
hourly wage" is the ratio of usual weekly earnings to usual weekly
hours. Individuals with allocated weekly earnings were deleted from the
sample, as were those who earned less than $1.67 per hour or more than
$150.00 per hour in 1988 dollars.
The "married" dummy variable equals one if the worker is married
with his or her spouse present. The "part-time" dummy variable equals
one if the worker usually works less than 35 hours per week. "Potential
experience" is age minus education minus 6. The "apprentice" dummy
variable equals one if the worker's occupation code is an apprentice.
The following 1970 Census industry (CIC) and occupation (COC)
codes were used to define the activities: truck drivers (CIC 417; COC
715), plumbers (CIC 67-78, COC 522 or 523), gasoline station employees
(CIC 648), nonprofessional hospital employees (CIC 838; COC 630, 690,
694, 762, 901-903, 912-916, or 950), and carpenters (CIC 67-78, COC 415
or 416). The following 1980 Census industry (CIC) and occupationThe Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance 141
(COC) codes were used to define the activities: truck drivers (CIC 410;
COC 804 or 805), plumbers (CIC 60, COC 585 or 587), gasoline station
employees (CIC 621), nonprofessional hospital employees (CIC 831;
COC 435-437, 439, 443-444, 449, 453, 748, 777, 883), and carpenters (CIC
60, COC 567 or 569).
C. BLSData
The BLS data are annual totals derived from quarterly ES-202 reports.
The BLS data consist of state-level averages for 3- and 4-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) groups. The dependent variable in col-
umns (1) and (3) of Table 6 is the change in the log of the arithmetic
average annual wage in each industry. The annual wage is in 1988 dol-
lars. The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is the change in log
employment. The SIC codes for the four activities in the basic sample in
Table 6 are truckers (SIC 421), plumbers (1711), gas stations (SIC 5541),
and carpenters (SIC 1751).
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